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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

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December 4, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *Hal*

*Copied in SRG books
Returned as requested 12/22
Rky*

SUBJECT: Latest on Palestinian Option

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I have drawn their essence into an analytical memo (Tab A) which you could send to the President for his background. If you do not wish to do this, please just treat it as written for you.

State Dept. review completed

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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INFORMATION
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December 4, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

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SUBJECT: Mid-East Settlement -- Palestinians and Hussein

Since this will be very much on Hussein's mind when he sees you, I wanted you to have this discussion of the issues. The Senior Review Group has had several discussions of the problem, and Ambassador Brown had a long talk with Hussein on the subject before Hussein left Amman.

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The U. S. Position

It is possible to argue that in the long run there is logic in the creation of an Arab Palestinian state paralleling the Jewish state in Israel as the final settlement of the Palestine problem. If this were done, it could be argued that the state most likely to be viable would be one including all of Jordan and Gaza. This would mean that Jordan in some way would have to come under Palestinian leadership.

It may well be that this will be the eventual outcome of the struggle in Jordan, but in our deliberations so far we have had difficulty in developing policy on the basis of the above argument. The chief dilemma is a major uncertainty about the Palestinian leadership's objectives toward Israel. Nowhere is it said that the proposed Palestinian entity would be prepared to make peace with Israel. In this situation, any U. S. move toward the Palestinian leadership could be read as backing away from Hussein -- who is prepared to make peace with Israel and give the Palestinians political autonomy -- in favor of a political group dedicated so far as we know to changing the Jewish character of Israel.

Although the problem of coming to terms with a group that may come out on top in Jordan is recognized, it has seemed so far that the only real U. S. choice is to continue to work through the established government in Jordan. One of the points that will be discussed with Hussein here is how the U. S. can help him in his programs to bring the Palestinians more actively into the negotiating process in ways that will bolster rather than undercut his position.

The above analysis will be reflected in your talking points.

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Saunders to Amman

Department of State

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problem. He has not yet worked

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SUBJECT: PALESTINIANS AND KING

REF: STATE 190308

*out in our mind when if
Palestinians should be brought
into Jarring talks. Favors
self-determination for West Bank.
It is clear that King does not trust
Arafat at all*

1. IN ACCORDANCE REFTTEL HAD ABOUT AN HOUR YESTERDAY WITH HUSSEIN PRIVATELY. THIS WAS AN EXPLORATORY TALK. WE WILL MEET AGAIN IN A FEW DAYS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION.
2. ON ARAFAT AND OUR MEETING WITH HIS REPS, I GAVE KING BACKGROUND AS WELL AS SOLID ASSURANCES THAT WE WANTED HIS CONSIDERED VIEWS BEFORE WE MADE DECISION AS TO WHETHER TO INITIATE THESE LIMITED AND GUARDED CONTACTS. AFTER SAYING HE SAW NO REAL OBJECTION, HE SAID HE WANTED TO THINK IT THROUGH AND WE WOULD DISCUSS LATER. I AGREED. (RIGHT NOW HE IS A BIT PIQUED BY ARAFAT'S EXAGGERATIONS AND LIES AT HIS VARIOUS PRESS CONFERENCES IN ARAB CAPITALS; HE ALSO NOTES DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WHAT ARAFAT IS DOING AND SAYING ABROAD AND WHAT BAKR AND OTHER FATAH LEADERS ARE DOING AND SAYING HERE AND WONDERS JUST WHO REPRESENTS WHAT AT THIS MOMENT.)
3. ON PALESTINIANS WE HAD LONG AND COMPLICATED DISCUSSION HE HIMSELF WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO FIND A PALESTINIAN QTE ENTITY UNQTE TO WHICH HE COULD TURN. HE FINDS NONE. IT IS NOT FATAH WHICH MAY BE ABLE TO SWIM IN PALESTINIAN SEA OF JORDANIAN AND LEBANESE REFUGEE CAMPS BUT HAS SHOWN NO SUCH CAPABILITY ON WEST BANK. IT IS NOT WEST BANK BOURGEOISIE WHO SEEM PREFER COMBINATION OF PEACE AND STATUS QUO ANTE. IT IS NOT PALESTINIANS WHO HAVE EMIGRATED TO KUWAIT OR SAUDI ARABIA BUT WHO ARE MORE INTERESTED IN MONEY AND REMITTANCES THAN IN ORGANIZING THEMSELVES POLITICALLY (OTHER THAN, AS HE NOTED SOMEWHAT SOURLY, TO FRIGHTEN KUWAIT INTO CUTTING OFF KHARTOUM PAYMENTS). IT IS NOT ISRAEL WHERE ARABS HAVE NO POLITICAL RIGHTS. IT IS NOT IN REFUGEE CAMPS WHERE INHABITANTS ARE UNDER CONSTANT FED-AYEEN PRESSURE.

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-2- SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 6712, NODIS, NOV 23

4. KING HAS INITIATED A SERIES OF POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS HERE IN JORDAN AND PM WASFI TELL IS DOING THE SAME. KING IS RECEIVING EVERY DAY GROUPS OF CITIZENS FROM VARIOUS AREAS (TODAY IT IS ZARKA AND AMMAN). THESE ARE WIDE-OPEN, FREE-RANGING TALKS IN WHICH HE IS TRYING TO ASSESS WHAT THE PEOPLE WANT. THESE TALKS WILL INCLUDE VARIOUS GROUPS OF PALESTINIANS, HOPEFULLY INCLUDING WEST BANKERS, EITHER OVER EXPRESSLY FOR THE TALKS OR RECENTLY EXPELLED. HE IS NOT SURE WHERE ALL THIS WILL LEAD TO; HE IS NOT AIMING A CONSENSUS BUT RATHER IS SEEKING INFORMATION.

5. HE VERY DEFINITELY WANTS TO SEE FURTHER DEFINITION OF WHAT PALESTINIANISM IS. WHILE HE HOPES SOMETHING WILL EMERGE FROM TALKS HE IS HAVING, HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THIS IS ENOUGH. HE IS WRITING, THEREFORE, TO HEADS OF ARAB STATES SUGGESTING A SUMMIT CONFERENCE TO BE HELD IN RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE TO DISCUSS THIS PRECISE ISSUE. IN SUMMIT HE WILL PUT ACROSS IDEAS HE HAS COME UP WITH BUT WILL MAINLY TRY TO CONFRONT OTHER ARAB LEADERS WITH NECESSITY DEFINING THEIR POSITION AND NOT MERELY REMOUTHING SLOGANS OF PAST. HE HOPES TO HAVE SOME REPLIES SOON SO THAT WE CAN DISCUSS FURTHER WHETHER SUMMIT CAN BE HELD AND HOW ITS DIRECTIONS MIGHT BE INFLUENCED.

6. HE IS ALSO THINKING OF CREATING VIABLE YOUTH MOVEMENT HERE IN JORDAN. POLITICAL PARTIES ARE DEFUNCT AND THERE IS NO DYNAMISM IN POLITICAL PROCESS LARGELY, HE BELIEVES, BECAUSE YOUTH IS NOT BEING GIVEN A SAY. HE IS CONSULTING WITH VARIOUS YOUTH GROUPS AND HOPES TO BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD ON THIS PROJECT IN EARLY JANUARY. HE BELIEVES THAT YOUTH ORGANIZATION (AND PERHAPS YOUTH CONGRESS) WHICH MAY EMERGE WILL BE SOMEWHAT RADICAL BUT IS HOPEFUL THAT IT CAN LOOK REALISTICALLY AT TWO PROBLEMS: (A) ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF JORDAN AND (B) A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. HE APPEARS TO BE THINKING, BUT THIS I WANT TO CHECK AGAIN, THAT PALESTINIAN YOUTH IN JORDAN SHOULD ORGANIZE ITSELF SEPARATELY YET BE PART OF LARGER GROUP SO AS TO HAVE AN IDENTITY AND MEANS TO PRESENT ITS VIEWS. (COMMENT: HE IS RATHER HOPEFUL ABOUT THIS EXPERIMENT BUT HAS NOT, I THINK, THOUGHT IT ALL THE WAY THROUGH YET.)

7. KING HAS NOT YET WORKED OUT IN HIS MIND WHEN AND IF PALESTINIANS SHOULD BE BROUGHT INTO JARRING TALKS. HE IS NOT AT ALL OPPOSED TO IDEA THAT PALESTINIANS SERVE ON THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION (AFTER ALL, EL FARRA' IS JORDAN'S APPOINTED PRINCIPLE). WHAT HE IS AFRAID OF IS THAT HE CANNOT GET NEW FACES INTO THE ACT. HE AGREES THAT POLITICALLY UNCONTAMINATED WEST BANKERS, INCLUDING RECENT EXPELLEES, WOULD BE USEFUL REPRESENTATIVES. IF,

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
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8. KING SAID THAT HE WOULD BE EXPANDING ON HIS IDEAS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION FOR WEST BANK WHILE IN US. ESSENTIALLY, HE SEES NO REASON WHY WEST BANK COULD NOT BE INDEPENDENT IF THAT IS WHAT WEST BANKERS WANT, ONCE WEST BANK IS RESTORED TO JORDAN. HE WOULD BE WILLING TO HAVE AN HONEST REFERENDUM BUT DID NOT SPECIFY WHETHER OR NOT HE MEANT UNSUPERVISED OR WHAT. BUT I THINK HE IS SINCERE IN STATEMENT THAT IT IS UP TO WEST BANKERS TO MAKE THEIR CHOICE: INDEPENDENCE, A FEDERATION IN WHICH THEY WOULD HAVE A LARGE MEASURE OF AUTONOMY AND AN QTE IDENTITY UNQTE, OR MAINTENANCE OF PRE-1967 RELATIONSHIP. HE SAID, IN FACT, THAT IF THEY WANT INDEPENDENCE, FINE.

THEN JORDAN WILL SAY THAT IT IS NO LONGER RESPONSIBLE FOR PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AND WILL BE ABLE TO RUN ITS FOREIGN POLICY JUST AS DOES UAR, ALGERIA OR ANY OTHER ARAB STATE WHICH HAS NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR PALESTINAINS BUT PLENTY OF ADVICE FOR JORDAN.

9. WE DID NOT GET INTO ANY DEPTH ON WHAT USG COULD DO TO HELP OR WHETHER WE SHOULD BE EXPANDING OUR CONTACTS WITH PALESTINIANS. SO FAR AS LATTER IS CONCERNED, HE KNOWS THAT WE ARE SEEING LOTS OF PALESTINIANS HERE AND IN BEIRUT. HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO THIS. IN FACT, HE IS INTERESTED IN WHAT WE THINK THEY ARE THINKING. AS FOR CONTACTS WITH FATAH AND OTHER FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS, I THINK THIS SHOULD REST A BIT UNTIL HE COMES BACK AT ME ON THE ARAFAT QUESTION.

10. ABOVE IS DISCURSIVE BUT IT WAS, AS IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN, A RATHER RAMBLING TALK. I WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS.

11. FOLLOWING IS AN ASIDE BUT MEANINGFUL ONE. I TOLD KING THAT I UNDERSTOOD THAT FATAH MAY HAVE SOME TAPES OF MY TALKS WITH HIM AND ZAID RIFAI DURING CRISIS AND THAT, SHOULD THESE BE BROUGHT INTO OPEN BY ARAFAT, IT MIGHT BE EMBARRASSING TO HIM. I SAID WE WOULD NATURALLY DENY AUTHENTICITY. I THOUGHT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO SCARE OFF FATAH BY THREATENING

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-2- SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 6712, NODIS, NOV 23

RELEASE SOME OF THEIR SECRETS. HE SAID, IF WE NEED IT, HE WOULD
GIVE US SOME TAPES WHICH WOULD BE MOST EMBARRASSING TO FATAH.
I WANTED TO WARN KING BUT ALSO TO SEE HIS REACTION. HE DOES
NOT TRUST ARAFAT ONE BIT AND THIS SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD.

BROWN

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